INTRODUCTION
The common wisdom is that there are twin, related villains in the saga of the "criminalization of persons with mental illness": the drastic elimination of psychiatric hospital beds in the 1970s and the 1980s as a result of the "civil rights revolution;" and the "failure" of the deinstitutionalization movement.' Both of these explanations are superficially appealing, but neither is correct. The reduction in state hospital beds -which began in 1954 when the first generation of antipsychotic drugs such as Thorazine were first made available 2 -was the logical outcome of revelations that state hospital systems were being overused inappropriately and in ways that consigned tens of thousands of citizens to the equivalent of lifetime sentences in substandard, dangerous pris-for reasons somehow related to deinstitutionalization and the enforcement of the civil rights of patients. It is a truism that (depending on where you live) Rikers Island or the Cook County House of Detention or the Los Angeles County jail is the "largest mental health facility in the nation."" Data tells us that there are three times as many individuals incarcerated in prison as institutionalized in mental hospitals and it is estimated that, in the United States, 14.5% of male adults in prisons and jails have a mental illness, as do 31% of female adultS 12 -a rate of two to four times that of the general population. 13 And, importantly, prisoners with mental illness are more likely to violate prison rules leading to disciplinary hearings, inappropriate sanctions, and segregation.1 4 It is clear that something has happened (and continues to happen), but I am not convinced at all that the common wisdom about it is anywhere nearly accurate.
The questions that I wish to address today are these: What are we missing, and what, if anything, can/should we do? But first, let me offer an idea to which we have failed to pay any attention in this context and suggest that it may be a major "hidden culprit" in this entire discussion. An idea that is based significantly on my own professional background, from the thirteen years that I was a "real lawyer" before I became a professor. I spent three years as a Deputy Public Defender in Trenton, New Jersey, and eight years as director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy (this was between 1971 and 1982 -not an unimportant factor in this story). A significant portion of my caseload involved the representation of persons with mental illness who had been charged with crime, often with serious crime.
I have recounted elsewhere the story of how, soon after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Indiana (thus "creating" modern mental health law),1 5 I filed a class action suit in New Jersey, Dixon v. Cahill, to implement Jackson (when I was but a rookie Public Defender), resulting in a court ruling that the indefinite incarceration of individuals in the Vroom Building -New Jersey's "maximum security facility for the criminally insane"' 6 -violated Jackson and that each institutionalized individual had a right to an individual hearing. "This was in 1973, and we quickly discovered cases of individuals who had been awaiting trial since 1963, 1953, 1948, and, in one case, 1928," and, when the dust settled, "the courts ultimately found that 185 of our 225 clients had been illegally detained." 7 The international publicity that flowed from this case led to the creation of the Division of Mental Health Advocacy in the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, and regularized the representation of persons being civilly committed against their will and those seeking release from institutionalization. This was all, of course, part and parcel of the mental health advocacy "movement" of the 1970s, an outgrowth of the greater turn to "public interest law" at this time in our nation's legal history.i 8 But, a series of developments in the 1980s changed the contours of this legal landscape, reflecting some "disenchantment on the part of the public ... and . .. federal courts with the notion of vastly expanding the civil rights and civil liberties of persons with mental disabilities." 9 Subsequently, in that numerically-small, but well-publicized (often over-publicized) universe of cases in which persons with serious mental disabilities are charged with serious crimes, 20 raising mental status defenses -never a great option for a criminal defense lawyer -became a much riskier and potentially-catastrophic option.
2 1 Although there has been a robust literature on the meaning and significance of these changes in criminal procedure, to the best of my knowledge, no one 15. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. 18. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 5, at 6-20 (discussing reasons for the expansion at this point in time of the rights of persons institutionalized because of mental disabilities).
19. yet has considered them in the context of the issue addressed in this paperthe criminalization of persons with mental illness. This will be a focus of my paper.
First, in Part I, I will address the "common wisdom" explanations, and explain why I find them wanting. Next, in Part II, I will consider the relevant major changes in criminal procedure over the past thirty years that have contributed significantly to the problems we face. Some of these changes include:
(1) the narrowing of the insanity defense, (2) the constitutional sanctioning of lengths of commitment for insanity acquittees that are far longer than the maximum sentences for the underlying charged offenses, (3) Supreme Court decisions making it less likely that jurors will accept the insanity defense, (4) the extended sentences faced by defendants who unsuccessfully raise the insanity defense, (5) the enlarged use of involuntary antipsychotic medication in efforts to make incompetent defendants competent to stand trial, and (6) the failure of most states to comply with the now-forty-year-old mandate of Jackson v. Indiana. In Part III, I will look at the potential use of therapeutic jurisprudence as a tool to deal with the current state of affairs. In Part IV, I will conclude with some policy recommendations in an effort to remediate the current problems, including the need to train lawyers on the issues I discuss in this paper and the role of mental health courts as a potentially ameliorating partial-solution.
My title comes from Bob Dylan's song, Political World, a song that he, alas, has not sung since February 1991. 22 The lyric comes from this couplet:
We live in a political world Wisdom is thrown into jail It rots in a cell, is misguided as hell Leaving no one to pick up a trail 23 Over a decade ago, I concluded that this line "captured the entire insanity defense debate." 24 The "worldview" of Political World is "dangerous and suspicious," filled with "anxiety and despair," and warns of "spiritual death." 25 It is, in the words of one critic, "Bob's commentary on the state of the fallen By continuing to mouth banal platitudes about the alleged villains in the scenario that we are discussing today, we continue to throw wisdom, along with uncounted persons with mental disabilities into jail.
I. THE COMMON WISDOM
Over twenty years ago, I summarized the common wisdom about deinstitutionalization in the following way, and little has happened in the intervening years to lead me to change what I then said:
The story goes something like this: nurtured by radical psychiatrists (such as Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing), spurred on by politically-activist organizations pushing egalitarian social agendas (such as the ACLU), a cadre of brilliant but diabolical patients' rights lawyers dazzled sympathetic and out-of-touch judges with their legal legerdemain -abetted by wooly-headed social theories, inapposite constitutional arguments, some ohmy-god worst-case anecdotes about institutional conditions, and a smattering of "heartwarming successful [deinstitutionalization] cases"-as a result of which courts entered orders "emptying out the mental institutions" so that patients could "die with their rights on." When cynical bureaucrats read the judicial handwriting on the hospital walls, they then joined the stampede, and the hospitals were thus emptied. Ergo deinstitutionalization. Ergo homelessness. Endgame.
28
I said then that that story was "all wrong. Dead wrong. Obscenely wrong." 29 And, in spite of a tsunami of polemic seeking to rectify the position that I reject, I still believe, perhaps more strongly than ever, that the story, indeed, is wrong.
30 I cast my lot here with Professor Sam Bagenstos who argues, persuasively, that "deinstitutionalization has been a success in many significant respects," 3 1 pointing out how many facilities -including the one IWisdom is Thrown into jail described as "Dachau without ovens" 32 -had been closed in the aftermath of the early wave of patients' rights litigation. He adds:
To be sure, we could solve the problem of homelessness among people with psychiatric disabilities by simply institutionalizing them for the long term. But other policies could solve that problem just as well--notably supportive housing, in which individuals obtain tenancy in apartments linked with supportive services. And yet, as homelessness was increasing in the 1980s, the federal and state governments were cutting Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and housing assistance--the very programs that could pay for community-based housing for people with psychiatric disabilities. The indictment of deinstitutionalization, as opposed to the failure to invest in community-based services and supports, does not rest on an empirical determination of what happened in the world so much as on a normative premise that institutionalization is preferable to community-based housing and supports. Given the undoubted harms of long-term institutionalization for people with psychiatric disabilities, and the viability of evidence-based community services ... there is no good reason to prefer institutionalization as the solution to the homelessness problem among people with psychiatric disabilities.
33
But deinstitutionalization is seen as the villain and criminalization as the inevitable by-product. 34 Never mind that there is empirical evidence that, in I hope I have shown that the past of deinstitutionalization litigation was, in key respects, far more successful than most observers acknowledge. The limits of that success were very real, though: although deinstitutionalization advocates succeeded in closing the front doors of large state institutions so that few new people with developmental or psychiatric disabilities came in, and in opening the back doors of those institutions so that the vast majority of long-term residents moved out, they were less successful in building a comprehensive system of adequate and appropriate services in the community. That key failure stemmed, I have argued, from two factors: limitations in the legal-doctrinal tools on which deinstitutionalization advocates relied; and a political alignment that created pressures to close institutions without building the communitybased services that would be necessary to replace them.
Id.
32. mental hospitals in the first place(I because of how much more time-consuming mental hospital "drop offs" are and for a variety of other reasons. 41 Never mind that the evidence is crystal-clear that "people with mental illness 'engage in offending and other forms of deviant behavior not because they have a mental disorder but because they are poor,"' 42 and that the strongest risk factors for violence "are shared by those with and without mental illness." 43 Never mind that "we know little about the true prevalence of mental illness among offenders throughout all stages of the criminal justice system, or about the extent to which the needs of mentally ill offenders are going unmet."44 Never mind that there is similarly substantial valid and reliable evidence that, if proper screening and placement procedures are employed, every resident of a large inpatient facility could be successfully placed in community settings. Never mind that we have not even begun to do serious research into, by way of example, the specific issues that relate to the status of elderly persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system. 46 Never mind the staggering fiscal costs of the current state of affairs. 47 And never mind, most importantly of all, that "[t]here is no evidence for the basic criminalization premise that decreased psychiatric services explain the disproportionate risk of incarceration for individuals with mental illness,"
48 that "there is little evidence that the risk of incarceration has uniquely increased for those with mental illness," 49 and that "no research exists demonstrating that mental illness is a principal or proximate cause of criminal behavior for most offenders with mental illnesses." 50 John Junginger and his colleagues state the valid and reliable research simply and precisely:
Unless it can be shown that factors unique to serious mental illness are specifically associated with behavior leading to arrest and incarceration, the criminalization hypothesis should be reconsidered in favor of more powerful risk factors for crime than are inherent in social settings occupied by persons with severe mental illness -risk factors such as unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and substance abuse. The "villainry" story -abetted by the pernicious use by the media and unscrupulous politicians of the vividness heuristic 52 -still captures the public debate (and to some extent, the scholarly debate), but it is one that must be flatly rejected.
53

II. CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
As I indicated in the Introduction, the past thirty years have seen a cluster of changes to criminal procedure (via statute and judicial decisions, both leading to changes in practice), that, in the aggregate, make the use of an insanity defense or the raising of a mental status issue a much less attractive option to the defendant than ever before. I will look at each of these separately:
A. The Shrinking of the Insanity Defense
Substantive and Procedural Limitations
We can logically look at March 30, 1981 -the day that John Hinckley shot Ronald Reagan -as the turning point in this area of the law. In my booklength treatment of the insanity defense, I even tided a sub-chapter "Reagan as Hinckley's victim; Hinckley as Reagan's victim" 54 so as to reflect this turn of events. "Post-Hinckley outrage served as a catalyst for public denunciation, which led to speedy legislative inquiry, 'reform' legislation, and ultimately, to a
The consequences of untreated mental illness and the resulting criminalization of the mentally ill can be attributed to a number of factors, including: severely underfunded community based systems of care, lack of adequate housing and the prevalence of homelessness, and the overall lack of specialized forensic services and supports for those reentering the community. Further, the increased use of illicit substances in the general population and among the mentally ill has likely made a significant contribution to an increase in all types of offenses. On the relationship between the risk factors of substance abuse and medication noncompliance, see (1997) (defining vividness heuristic as "a cognitive-simplifying device through which a 'single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choices should be made"'). On the role of the media and of politicians in this context, see Perlin, supra note 1, at 110-11 nn. 272-76.
53. This is not to say that there are not many people with psychosocial disabilities in jails and prisons, and it in no way ignores the sobering statistics referred to earlier. Seegenerall, e.g., Fellner, supra note 13; Canales, supra note 13. Rather, it suggests that the blame is misplaced in ways that make it less likely that we will turn to ameliorative action in an effort to remediate the problems at hand. See SIATiF &JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 28-29.
54. See PERIN, supra note 21, at 333-48.
'shrinkage' of the insanity defense." 55 There is no question that the Hinckley acquittal "helped legitimize long-standing efforts at both the state and federal levels to abolish or reform the defense," 5 6 and that those efforts were, by and large, successful.
This shrinkage involved three components: (1) restrictions on the limits of the substantive test (in this case, the elimination of the so-called "volitional" prong in the federal Act), 57 (2) alterations in the procedural aspects of the insanity plea (in this case, both the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant, and changing the quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a plea); 58 and (3) increased restrictions on insanity acquittees following their postacquittal commitment to psychiatric institutions. 59 In the wake of the Reagan shooting, twenty-six different pieces of legislation were soon introduced into Congress to abolish or limit the insanity defense. 60 The bill that was ultimately enacted as the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 ("IDRA") had the effect of 'returning the insanity defense in federal jurisdictions to status quo ante 1843: the year of . .. [the] M'Naghten [casel.' 6 1 Fundamentally, the bill that was ultimately enacted changed the law in four material ways: 1) it shifted the burden of proof to defendants, by a quantum of clear and convincing evidence; 2) it articulated, for the first time, a substantive insanity test, adopting a more restrictive version of MNaghlen, thus discarding the ALI-Model Penal Code test previously in place in all federal circuits; 62 3) it established strict procedures for the hospitalization and release of defendants found NGRI and incompetent to stand trial; and 4) it severely limited the scope of expert testimony in insanity cases. 63 Similarly, States responded in a similar manner."' Seventy-five percent of all states made some sort of substantive change in insanity defense in the 1978-85 period. In fifteen of sixteen states that changed post-acquittal procedures, commitment terms were lengthened, court supervision was tightened, or the burden of proof was altered -by shifting the burden from state to de- fendant and/or reducing the quantum of proof from "beyond a reasonable doubt" to "preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing evidence." In six of eight states that changed the substantive test, the definition was restricted [either by changing from the ALI-Model Penal Code test or M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse to M'Naghten, or by restricting insanity defense testimony to mens rea evidence]. 65 In twelve jurisdictions, a Guilty But Mentally Ill ("GBMI") verdict 66 was added.
67
In four states, the defense has been abolished. 68 Interestingly, where the insanity defense has been abolished, there is often a statistically significant increase in the number of defendants found permanently incompetent to stand trial.
69
In short, the insanity defense -never an attractive option for a criminal defendant 70 -has become far less attractive in the past thirty years. Inevitably, this has increased the number of persons with serious mental illness in state prisons.
The Implications of Raising the Defense
One of the prevailing insanity defense myths is that insanity acquittees "spend much less time in custody than do defendants convicted of the same offenses."' Contrary to this myth, NGRI acquittees actually spend almost double the amount of time that defendants convicted of similar charges spend in prison settings and often face a lifetime of post-release judicial oversight.
72
Most importantly for the perspectives of this presentation, the less serious the offense, the longer the gap is between the amount of time that an insanity acquittee serveS 73 and the amount of time that a convicted defendant serves. A California study, by way of example, has revealed that those found NGRI of non-violent crimes were confined for periods over nine times as long. 74 Thus, it makes progressively less sense for a defendant to raise the insanity defense.
75
But there is more. Just raising the defense is a high-risk maneuver. Defendants who raise the insanity defense and are unsuccessful serve significantly longer sentences than those who did not assert the defense. 76 Also, the Supreme Court decision in Shannon v. United States, which held that, as a matter of federal criminal procedure, the defendant had no right to have the jury informed about the possible consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, 77 will likely make it even less likely that the insanity defense will be employed. Elsewhere, I have characterized this decision as "bizarre." 78 Not unimportantly, this state of affairs will likely increase the amount of pretextuality in decision making in this area of the law. 79 In her opinion for the Court in Pent v. Lnaugh, 80 Justice O'Connor argued:
The common law prohibition against punishing "idiots" for their crimes suggests that it may indeed be "cruel and unusual" punishment to execute persons who are profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions. Because of the protections afforded by the insanity defense today, such a person is not likely to be convicted or face the prospect of punishment. 8 '
I wrote nearly ten years ago that this statement "ignores the postHinckley political reality that the insanity defense has been severely truncated in many jurisdictions and has been 'abolished' in others," 82 and certainly nothing has happened in the intervening decade to lead me to change my mind on this point. As with the substantive reduction of the insanity defense and its procedural tightening discussed above, these factors again, make the insanity defense an even less attractive option.
The Length of Post-acquittal Commitments
In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled, in Jones v. United States, 83 that it was not unconstitutional to retain insanity acquittees for longer periods of time than the maximum sentence for the underlying crime, 84 finding that there is no correlation between severity of crime committed and time necessary for "recovery." 85 The defendant in Jones had been arrested for attempted petty
512 U.S 573 (1994).
78. 2 PERLIN, supra note 5, at 197, 199 (characterizing the decision as either "atypically naive, meretricious, or simply deceitful").
79. Prextextuality defines the ways in which courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision- 
Wisdom is Thrown into jail
larceny (shoplifting); yet, the Court saw no reason to treat a misdemeanor case any different from a case involving a murder, rape, or armed robbery. In its decision, the Court quoted an earlier decision of the District of Columbia Circuit that had been written by Chief Justice Burger: "Mo describe the theft of watches and jewelry as 'non-dangerous' is to confuse danger with violence. Larceny is usually less violent than murder or assault, but in terms of public policy the purpose of the statute is the same as to both."
Jones was a political decision that permitted indeterminate commitment and reflected the Supreme Court's "unwillingness to contradict public sentiment (soon after the Hinckley acquittal) in such a controversial area." 87 "It further provided the Court with a vehicle to impose its dissatisfaction with the insanity defense on defendants who succeeded in the use of a plea by making it even less likely that the plea would be used in the future," 88 "illuminat[ing] the Court's antipathy toward insanity pleaders."89
B. The Perils of Raising the Incompetency Status
Unlike the insanity defense, which can be raised only by the defendant, defense counsel, the prosecutor or the judge can raise the question of incompetency, if there is a "bona fide doubt" that the defendant is, in fact, competent to stand trial. 90 9 ' What has become clear now is that the mere raising of the status can place the defendant at great risk.
First, in spite of the Supreme Court's decisionfory years ago in Jackson v. Indiana 92 that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held "more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future," 93 astoundingly, this decision continues to be ignored by half the states. 94 What this means is that individuals who should "fit" under the language of Jackson are often kept in maximum-security facilities for far longer than the three and a half year "cut off" period adopted by the Jackson court. 95 At least one state Supreme Court has specifically sanctioned procedures that ignore the Jackson holding. 95. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738-39 ("We note ... that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently estabhshes the lack of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial."). The mere raising of the incompetency status is often a perilous decision. There are multiple reasons why an effective and competent defense lawyer might not even raise the question of incompetency, among them the lack of availability of bail, the conditions of institutionalization at the referral hospital, and the possible iatrogenic or ameliorative impact of psychiatric institutionalization on the defendant. 97 Josephine Ross has suggested that an "ethic of care" might call for disregarding incompetency concerns, 98 and Christopher Slobogin and Amy Mashburn underscore that the raise-or-not-raise decision is necessarily a "nuanced" one. 99 In a particularly thoughtful piece, Keri Gould has argued that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel may ethically support the decision to ignore the competency question entirely.'oo This issue is of special importance in the case of defendants charged with petty offenses who face little or no jail time if convicted, but who may be institutionalized for years in maximum security facilities once the status issue is raised.1 01 This all raises the spectre of what is called the "incredible dilemma:" What can or should be done when multiple civil, constitutional, or statutory rights and policies clash?1 02 Certainly, an outcome of this dilemma is likely to cause a reduction of the number of cases in which the incompetency status is raised, thus, increasing the number of defendants with mental disabilities in jail and prison facilities.
Second, involuntary medication is often the intervention of choice when restoration of competency to stand trial is sought. The Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States' 03 -holding that although a defendant has a qualified right to refuse to take antipsychotic drugs prescribed solely to render him competent to stand trial, medication over objection is permissible where the court finds that treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking ac- count of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further "important governmental trial-related interests" 10 " -makes it clear that many defendants will be so medicated as part of the restoration process.
0 5 Few -if any -areas of mental disability law have been as contentious over the years as the right to refuse treatment in civil cases, 106 an area where "civil treatmentrefusers" are likely to have more rights than do forensic patients. 07 Certainly, raising the incompetency status, knowing that it brings with it the potential risk of such involuntary medication becomes a potentially perilous decision for defense counsel. In short, defendants seeking to avoid the perils of involuntary medication might well be better off ignoring the question of their competency to stand trial.
C. Conclusion
Every change to the insanity defense in the past thirty years, and every aspect of incompetency-to-stand-trial practice has made it less likely that these statuses/defenses will be employed in cases of defendants with mental illness -especially major mental illness -and charged with crime -especially minor crimes. Astoundingly, to my mind, this factor has never been raised seriously in the "criminalization" debate.
I turn now to the use of therapeutic jurisprudence as a potential tool of remediation.
III. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 08
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence. 109 Initially employed in cases involving individuals with mental dis-abilities, but subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.' o The ultimate aim of therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process principles."' There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: "the law's use of "mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."11 2 As I have written elsewhere, "[a]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties."" 3 Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives"114 and focuses on the law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being. 115 It suggests that "law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring about healing and wellness". In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of topics through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not limited to, all aspects of mental disability law, domestic relations law, criminal law and procedure, employment law, gay rights law, and tort law.'
17 As Ian Freckelton has noted, "it is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing sociopsychological insights into the law and its applications." 118 It is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully.'1 9 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been described as "a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law . . . which emphasises psychological welness over adversarial triumphalism." 20 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence supports an ethic of care.1
21
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is a commitment to dignity.1 22 Professor Amy Ronner describes the "three Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness, 123 arguing:
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at least participating in, their own decisions. 124 The question to be addressed here is this: in light of what I have discussed in the prior parts of this paper (the data as to the real relationship between mental illness and criminalization, and the impact of recent insanity defense and incompetency developments on the "pathways" of persons with serious mental disabilities charged with crime), to what extent does therapeutic jurisprudence offer us remediating suggestions and/or solutions?
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY What should be clear from the earlier sections of this article is that the common wisdom is mostly wrong about the relationship between criminalization and mental disability. It is wrong in its characterization of how the current state of affairs came about, it is wrong in the causal connections it makes, and it is wrong in its failure to inquire into the ways that changes in criminal law and procedure must be carefully considered in any investigation of this issue. This is not to say that there is no connection between criminality and mental disability at all,125 but that the connection is a modest one and one that applies only to a small subgroup of the relevant population.
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Researchers such as Jennifer Skeem and her associates have done a herculean job of pointing this out, but sadly much of their work -all validated, all reliable -has fallen on deaf ears, perhaps because it is, in so many ways, dissonant with our warped "ordinary common sense [OCS] ."27 Writing recently about the impact of this false OCS on our insanity defense jurisprudence, I said this:
Reliance on OCS is one of the keys to an understanding of why and how, by way of example, insanity defense jurisprudence has developed. Not only is it pre-reflexive and selfevident, it is also susceptible to precisely the type of idiosyncratic, reactive decision making that has traditionally typified insanity defense legislation and litigation. "Ordinary common sense" (OCS) is a "powerful unconscious animator of legal decision making." It is a psychological construct that reflects the level of the disparity between perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary in deciding cases involving individuals with mental disabilities. OCS is self-referential and non-reflective: "I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way, therefore that's the way it is." It is supported by our reliance on a series of heuristics-cognitive-simplifying devices that distort our abilities to consider information rationally. On a recent flight, the person next to me on the crowded airplane began to chat with me. When I told her about what I researched and studied, she looked at me with a big grin. "I LOVE forensic science," she said. "I watch CSI whenever I can. They can do such amazing things. It's all so high tech-and incredibly accurate! It's almost like magic, isn't it?" She leaned in a bit closer and looked at me intently. "Tell me, is it like that in real life?" I looked at her for a moment before answering. I felt a bit like the older child on the playground about to reveal to her younger friend that Santa Clause doesn't really exist. I shook my head. "No, I wouldn't say that CSI's depiction is entirely realistic. In the re-Certainly, this is a major culprit in the area of law and social policy under discussion here.
Consider, then, the potential application of therapeutic jurisprudence to this state of affairs. In doing this, it is necessary to consider all of this in the specific context of mental health courts.1 29 Briefly, mental health courts -one form of "problem-solving courts"o 30 -follow the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence, in an attempt "to improve justice by considering the therapeutic and anti-therapeutic consequences that flow from substantive rules, legal procedures, or the behavior of legal actors."131 They are designed to deal holisticallyl 32 with people arrested (usually, but not exclusively, for nonviolent misdemeanors)' 3 3 when mental illness, rather than criminality, appears to be al world, forensic science isn't nearly so glossy. It isn't nearly so speedy. And most important, it isn't nearly so foolproof, either." "Really? That's too bad," she told me. She looked at me directly for a brief moment, shook her head, and then looked away. "Well, to tell you the truth, I think I'd rather just keep believing in the television version." Figuring that reality was not going to be any match for CSI, I shrugged, and went back to the book I was reading.) Id.
129. Mental health courts should accept violent felonies because it is morally unsound to punish criminal behavior that is mainly a product of mental disease. With appropriate eligibility criteria, the new mental health court model would encapsulate persons who are not shielded by the insanity defense -especially persons from post-Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983) ... Japproving stringent statutory measures governing releases of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, see 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL the precipitating reason for the behavior in question. 134 The mental health court judge 35 seeks to divert the individual from the criminal court in exchange for an agreement to participate in community treatment, 136 and to "help participants avoid future criminal court involvement." 37 What impact does this have on the question at hand? Judge Ginger Lerner Wren is explicit: "The innovation of mental health courts was a direct judicial response to the trend known as the 'criminalization of the mentally il."'138 I agree with the late Professor Bruce Winick that, in this specific context, problem-solving courts and therapeutic jurisprudence "can do much to transform laiv into an instrument of healing for both the individual and the community,"' 39 and with Janet York and her colleagues that "therapeutic jurisprudence in the court system reduces stigmatization of addicts and shifts the court's focus from criminalization . . . to treatment."'4 The therapeutic jurisprudence-basis of mental health courts is a perfect antidote to so much of both the actual criminalization of persons with mental illness and the criminalization "debate." One of the great values of the "Memphis program" discussed earlier is how it has "resulted in reduced injuries and arrests and in-creased diversion of mentally ill individuals into treatment programs.141 There is a robust literature describing diversion programs that have "worked," meaning that the individuals involved have been afforded treatment and been able to avoid all of the negative consequences of prison incarceration.1 42 Such programs clearly reflect the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence.
Also, in such programs, the individual subject to the court proceeding is far more likely to feel that he has a "voice." Recall Professor Ronner's "three V's" -voice, voluntariness and validation 43 -and consider them in the context of the research that has been done about the Broward County Mental Health Court. That research tells us that defendants who appear in that court report a higher score on a "dignity" scale (and a lower score on a "perceived coercion" scale)144 than any group of criminal defendants who have ever been studied.1 45 In short, the actual, real life experiences of the litigants in cases before judge Wren -the presiding judge of the Broward Court 46 demonstrates that at least one mental health court can be a non-coercive, dignified experience that provides procedural justice and therapeutic jurisprudence to those before it. 147 We also must consider the question of the adequacy of counsel appointed to represent the defendants who are the subject of consideration here. 148 What about counsel? I have written often about the scandalous lack of effective counsel made available to persons with mental disabilities in the civil commitment and criminal justice processes. 149 What is the quality of counsel available to litigants in mental health courts?
Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues have expressed concern "as to whether defendants in mental health courts receive adequate representation by their attorneys."s 0 Terry Carney characterizes the assumption that adequate counsel will be present at hearings to guarantee liberty values as a "false hope."1'
5
Henry Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer summarize the salient issues: It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust in an attorney unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance with her wishes. The client with mental illness may already doubt the attorney's loyalty. This risk is exacerbated when the attorney is appointed by the court. The client may wonder whether the attorney has been assigned in order to zealously represent her, or instead to facilitate her processing through the legal system . . . . There are thus strong personal disincentives to thorough preparation, even for the committed attorney .... There are also institutional pressures: The attorney who depends on the goodwill of others in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull his punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future interactions (which he would put to use for his future clients). Judges want cases resolved. receive dignity and respect, are given a sense of voice and validation."1 53 Turning to the legal education clinical context, David Wexler has suggested that students might "consider the kind of dialogue a lawyer might have with a client about the pros and cons of opting into a [drug treatment court] or mental health court." 54 It is essential that counsel has "a background in mental health issues and in communicating with individuals who may be in crisis." 5 5
One of the critical functions of counsel is to "protect the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial." 5 6 Fair process norms such as the right to counsel "operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state power to ensure that the individual suspect is treated with dignity and respect" 157 Recently, in an article about the significance of trained counsel in efforts to effectuate social change in nations with developing economies in Asia, I said this: "There is no question that one of the most critical aspects of law reform is the presence of dedicated and knowledgeable counsel. Without the assignment of such counsel, meaningful and ameliorative change is almost impossible to achieve."' 5 8
I believe that precisely the same argument can be made with regard to the issues under discussion here.
Also, consider here the role of judges.1 59 Judge Michael King has written eloquently about the need for judges to become experts in the interpersonal aspects of judging, noting that, depending on the circumstances, judging may require "particular listening and communication skills, the expression of empathy, the use of techniques of persuasion or motivational interviewing, the use of techniques to settle child witnesses and collaborative problem-solving techniques." 1 60 Certainly, the need for these skills is intensified in cases involving the population in question.
In discussing the question of the link between mental illness and criminal behavior, Professor Jennifer Skeem and her colleagues recommended three policy priorities: (1) identifying offenders for whom mental illness directly causes criminal behavior; (2) identifying "evidence-based corrections," including, isolating "the ingredients of existing programs that reduce recidivism;" and (3) assessing and addressing system bias, whether this bias is "motivated by fear or paternalism." 61 I believe all three of these are important goals that we should seek to implement. Her third goal -the focus on bias, partially motivated by fear -is at the core of the sanist and pretextual behavior that controls the entire mental health system, especially when mental health and criminal justice issues are intertwined. 162 I believe that, until we face this issue, our efforts at remediation are doomed to failure. However, if we do -as I think we must -use therapeutic jurisprudence as a mechanism to "expose pretextuality and strip bare the law's sanist fagade,"l 63 I believe then, and only then, will we be able to make authentic ameliorative change.
My title, again, comes from Bob Dylan's underappreciated song, Political World. The lines that immediately follow the one that I use in the title are these:
It [referring to wisdom] rots in a cell, is misguided as hell Leaving no one to pick up a trail. 164 The world that Dylan describes in this song is, per Oliver Trager, a "cold and incomprehensible place." 1 65 So is a prison stay for so many persons with mental disabilities. It is time we, again, with a nod to a different Dylan song, "strike another match [and] go start anew;" 1 66 it is the least that we can do.
